One of the most fascinating developments in the field of international law in recent decades has been the astonishing dissemination of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely standards or directives that explicitly prevent the imposition of legal obligations to the parties concerned. From a philosophical point of view, this is rather enigmatic: how to explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding treaty? In this article, I would like to give an overview of the reasons of the soft law from the point of view of practical reasons in the game. First of all, I dissor the idea of authoritarian consultation and I propose that the authorities, when advising their alleged subjects, pretend to give the question the question presumed grounds for taking action. I explain the alleged reasons. Secondly, I propose that, in the case of non-binding agreements, there should be something quite similar, associated with the particular responsibilities that such agreements constitute without exception. One of the most fascinating developments in the field of international law in recent decades has been the astonishing dissemination of non-binding legal instruments, commonly referred to as soft law. The form and origin of different non-binding legal instruments are very different, but what they have in common is the proclamation of norms, obligations or directives that expressly avoid imposing legal obligations on the parties concerned. The legal status of soft law is discussed in the literature, but my concern in this essay is different: I would like to set out the reasons for soft law from the point of view of practical reasons that can rationalize these instruments. The argument focuses on the analysis of the idea of authoritarian consultation, which suggests that when the authorities advise their supposed subjects, they claim to give to the subject what I cite as presumed grounds for action.

I explain here what the presumed reasons are and what they justify, considering it as a model for the practical reasons in which soft law works vertically, in the case of non-binding directives from international authorities. Horizontal soft law, which normally takes the form of international agreements, is also explained by the use of the idea of presumed motives, as well as the reciprocal relationships of responsibility that these agreements constitute without exception. Law – Society: Public Law – Constitutional Law eJournal International Institutions: Laws, Rule-Making/Interpretation, -Compliance eJournal Myron Taylor HallCornell UniversityIthaca, NY 14853-4901 USA Subscribe to this free journal for more articles commissioned on this topic For short-term access, please contact your Oxford Acade account above. . Most users should log in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username, please use it to log in. . . .

Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series . HOME PAGE: www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio_andrei_marmor.cfm You don`t have an Oxford Academic account yet? Register. International Institutions: Transnational Networks eJournal 25 Pages Posted: 15 May 2017 Last updated: 18 July 2017 . . International Political Economy: Trade Policy eJournal Public International Law: Courts – Adjudication eJournal Keywords: Soft Law, Nonbinding Legal Instruments, Nonbinding Treaties, Practical Authority, Authoritative Advice, Presumptive Reasons, International Authorities, Nonbinding Directives.